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Abstract
Background: In the ongoing conflicts of Syria and Yemen, there have been widespread reports of attacks on health
care facilities and personnel. Tabulated evidence does suggest hospital bombings in Syria and Yemen are far higher
than reported in other conflicts but it is unclear if this is a reporting artefact.
Objective: This article examines attacks on health care facilities in conflicts in six middle- to high- income countries
that have occurred over the past three decades to try and determine if attacks have become more common, and to
assess the different methods used to collect data on attacks. The six conflicts reviewed are Yemen (2015-Present),
Syria (2011- Present), Iraq (2003–2011), Chechnya (1999–2000), Kosovo (1998–1999), and Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1992–1995).
Methods: We attempted to get the highest quality source(s) with summary data of the number of facilities attacked
for each of the conflicts. The only conflict that did not have summary data was the conflict in Iraq. In this case, we
tallied individual reported events of attacks on health care.
Results: Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) reported attacks on 315 facilities (4.38 per month) in Syria over a 7-year
period, while the Monitoring Violence against Health Care (MVH) tool launched later by the World Health Organization
(WHO) Turkey Health Cluster reported attacks on 135 facilities (9.64 per month) over a 14-month period. Yemen had a
reported 93 attacks (4.65 per month), Iraq 12 (0.12 per month), Chechnya > 24 (2.4 per month), Kosovo > 100 (6.67 per
month), and Bosnia 21 (0.41 per month). Methodologies to collect data, and definitions of both facilities and attacks
varied widely across sources.
Conclusion: The number of reported facilities attacked is by far the greatest in Syria, suggesting that this phenomenon
has increased compared to earlier conflicts. However, data on attacks of facilities was incomplete for all of the conflicts
examined, methodologies varied widely, and in some cases, attacks were not defined at all. A global, standardized
system that allows multiple reporting routes with different levels of confirmation, as seen in Syria, would likely allow for
a more reliable and reproducible documentation system, and potentially, an increase in accountability.
Keywords: Attacks, Health care, Facilities, Syria, Yemen, Surveillance, Conflict
Background
Introduction
The Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute
demand protections for health facilities and health
care providers. Yet breaches of these protections have
been reported by authoritative sources in Yemen and
Syria without eliciting an effective response from the
international community.
Objective
We attempt to determine whether attacks on health
facilities in the current conflicts in Yemen (2015-Present)
and Syria (2011- Present) have become more common-
place compared to earlier conflicts in Iraq (2003–2011),
Chechnya (1999–2000), Kosovo (1998–1999) and Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1992–1995), and to gain lessons
revealed by the different methods utilized for monitoring
attacks in these conflicts.
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Methods
Four conflicts considered most comparable to Syria and
Yemen were selected in middle- to upper-income
countries where reporting of attacks was likely to occur.
Initially we conducted a search in MEDLINE, PubMed,
ProQuest, Google Scholar and Google using combina-
tions of the following keywords: hospital(s), clinic,
facility, health care system, private health care, number,
doctors, nurses, attack(ed), bombing, killed, Bosnia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Kosovo,
Chechnya, 2nd Chechen War. Custom date ranges on
Google and Google Scholar were used to exclude events
and reports that were published before or after the
conflicts. The data identified included primary and
secondary sources consisting of newspaper articles, peer-
reviewed journal articles, and open- source platforms.
Secondary sources were identified as references in pri-
mary documents. In all conflicts except Iraq, summary
or review articles of attacks on facilities existed and
created a more complete (in terms of number of attacks)
record than the sum of all identified reports. We
attempted to use the best summary data of attacks on
health care for each of the conflicts, sometimes combin-
ing information from different summaries. Best source is
defined as a credible authority, such as the WHO, and
broadest coverage in terms of time and space. In Iraq,
we tallied individual reported events of attacks on health
care. Summary data in the other conflicts came from
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Bosnian Ministry of Health,
the World Bank and Unicef.
The time range identified for each of the conflicts is
based on the source’s period of review. Because there is
no summary source for Iraq, the duration that was used
for the search and tally is the official period of American
occupation (2003–11).
An attack on a health care facility was a priori defined
as any form of physical violence or obstruction that in-
terferes with the accessibility and delivery of health care,
including all types of structures that provide health care
and transport to medical facilities. This definition was
used for the conflict in Iraq because we tallied individual
events of attacks from newspaper and organization ac-
counts. However, the concept and definition of an attack
on a health care facility varied between the other sum-
mary sources. The source data for the conflicts in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and in Yemen had narrow definitions
and primarily included reports of attacks on hospitals.
The population-based surveys undertaken by Physicians
for Human Rights examining the conflicts in Chechnya
and Kosovo defined an attack as an act of intentional
destruction to a facility or clinic. For the conflict in
Syria, Physicians for Human Rights defines an attack as
a “violent assault upon a facility resulting in any
destruction, damage or loss of the facility’s function,
equipment or medical supplies [1].” The WHO Turkey
Health Cluster does not explicitly define what they
consider an attack, but the authors, “describe the use of
this tool to produce primary data for attacks on health-
care facilities, ambulances, health workers, and patients.”
All of the incidents subsequently reported in the article
are attacks on health facilities [2]. The source data from
WHO and Unicef for Yemen do not define what they
consider an attack on a health care facility.
While these definitions vary in many aspects, all
consider an attack as a violent event that interferes with
health care delivery, with the main difference relating to
the inclusion criteria for what constitutes a facility. How-
ever, it is possible and likely that researchers attempted
to assess the primary type of facility that was targeted
during that conflict. For example, clinics were specific-
ally targeted as Serbs systematically destroyed villages
where Kosovar Albanians lived [3].
Efforts were made to estimate the total number of fa-
cilities in each location at the start of the conflict so that
rates of attacks could be recorded. This proved very dif-
ficult because of contradictory estimates (e.g. Chechnya),
out-of-date information or lack of private facility docu-
mentation (e.g. attack reports included events affecting
both public and private facilities in Syria, but little
information could be found regarding estimates of the
number of private facilities in Syria.)
In the initial results, we report attacks using the
language, facility or hospital, utilized by the source. For
simplification and consistency thereafter, the term
“facilities” is used in summary tables and discussion.
International law requires steps to avoid harm to med-
ical personnel and facilities as much as possible [4, 5].
Indiscriminate bombing and attacks that affect health
care still violate international law, and thus we include
data about attacks regardless if intentionality is known
or not. However, where intentionality was reported by
authors as part of the attack definition or the data
collected, it is presented in the discussion section. All
attacks are given equal weight, regardless of the size of
facility in our summaries.
Results
Physicians for Human Rights reported 465 attacks on
315 different medical facilities from March 2011 to
March 2017 in Syria. The method for collecting data is
done through a three step process, 1) open source
searches on the internet, 2) triangulation with additional
open source reports, and 3) corroboration with satellite
images and partners in-country [1, 6]. The Monitoring
Violence against Health Care (MVH) network launched
by the WHO Turkey health cluster reported 402 attacks,
with attacks on 135 different facilities, over the period
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from November 2015–December 2016 in Syria. The
method to collect and verify data requires an internal
health cluster partner to send an alert with information
of an attack to a WhatsApp group, and a second exter-
nal partner then verifies the attack by physically visiting
the location. [2]. In Yemen, the WHO reported that
between March 2015 and August 2016, 102 health care
facilities have been partially or totally damaged, and
Unicef has orally verified but not published reports
on 93 attacks on hospitals from March 2015 to De-
cember 2016 [7, 8]. Neither of these sources included
methodology information on how data was collected
for these attacks.
In Iraq between March 2003 and December 2011, an
estimated 12 health facilities were bombed, stormed,
or attacked by American forces and suicide bombers
[9–21]. These sources of data were all events cap-
tured by the media. The methodologies to verify this
information are not defined in the published articles.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, initial sources pointed to 18
hospitals attacked and were corroborated by reports from
a Bosnian Ministry of Health official and the World Bank,
which stated that 30% of hospitals were destroyed during
the conflict [22–28]. There were a reported 70 hospitals in
Bosnia and Herzegovina before the start of the conflict,
which places the estimate of attacks at 21 hospitals [29].
The Bosnian Ministry of Health official and the World
Bank did not cite the methodology for determining the
estimate of 30% destruction of hospitals, but it can be
assumed that this information was well known given the
small number of reported hospitals in the country.
Population-based surveys were conducted by Physician
for Human Rights in partnership with the Program on
Forced Migration at Columbia University in Kosovo and
Chechnya. In Kosovo, between February 1998 and June
1999, PHR confirmed the “intentional destruction” of at
least 100 clinics and 24 facilities in Chechnya between
August 1999 and May 2000 [3, 30]. The survey of Kos-
ovar refugees utilized a modified form of systematic
probability sampling in refugee camps [3]. Respondents
in the Chechen survey were randomly selected from
refugee camp registrations. In both, interviewers asked
respondents if they had seen medical facilities that were
destroyed, who the perpetrator was, date of the attack,
name and location of facility [3, 30].
Table 1 below suggests that Syria has the greatest
number of reported facilities attacked compared to all
other conflicts. Yemen and Kosovo have similarly
reported high numbers, followed by a distinct decrease
in the 2nd Chechen war and Bosnia. Iraq has the least
number of reported attacks.
The number of facilities attacked per month is pre-
sented in Table 2 with the number of facilities attacked
divided by the length of the review period. When using
the MVH findings, Syria has the greatest number of
facilities attacked per month at 9.64 per month. Kosovo
has the second highest number of facilities attacked per
month at 6.67 per month. Yemen follows at 4.65 per
month. The Physicians for Human Rights Syria figure
for Syria 4.38 facilities attacked per month.
Discussion
There appears to be a tendency in the press and among
scholars to report human rights violations, such as
executions of children or killing of UN Peacekeepers, as
numbers, not as rates. This implies that each such event
is unacceptable and noteworthy on its own. We consider
an attack on a health care facility such an event. This
makes the comparison of conflict-related attacks on
health facilities meaningful, even with countries of vastly
different sizes and unknown denominators of legally
protected health care sites.
The data uncovered from the literature review may be
incomplete and not fully accurate in some cases. Sources
of information across conflicts both defined and
collected data on attacks in different ways. While likely
incomplete, these conflicts were in highly developed
countries and experienced considerable press scrutiny,
and thus likely constitute a significant fraction of events.
Undoubtedly, attacks on health care facilities during war
are not a new phenomenon. Yet, this research suggests
that the conflict in Syria has experienced far more events
compared to the other conflicts examined, even though
Iraq and Yemen have larger populations, and the Iraqi
Table 1 Total number of facilities attacked





2nd Chechen War > 24
Kosovo > 100
Bosnia 21
aPHR reported #/MVH reported # in 20% of time
Table 2 Facility attacks per month







2nd Chechen War 10 2.4
Kosovo 15 6.67
Bosnia 44 0.41
aPHR reported first, MVH second
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conflict lasted longer. Also, given conflicting reports and
the existence of private health facilities in places like
Syria, we found it nearly impossible to determine the
denominator of facilities at risk and therefore we do not
report rates of attacks.
Syria provides the only context in which two method-
ologies can be compared. It is not possible to draw a
conclusion about the sensitivity of the two methodolo-
gies without access to their databases to examine indi-
vidual events. It is also not feasible to compare the raw
numbers or the number of facilities attacked per month
because they cover different time periods. However, it is
worth nothing that in 2016, Physicians for Human
Rights reported a total of 108 attacks on facilities,
and MVH reported 158 attacks from November
2015–December 2016 [1, 2]. While the time period is
not exactly the same, it appears that MVH captured a
greater number of reported events during 2016. Given
the provided data, it cannot be determined if the
difference in reported numbers is due to different
sensitives of the systems, different geographic spread
of captured events, different verification processes or
a combination of factors.
The data in Yemen is also extremely troubling and
suggests that attacks on health care occurred regularly
during the majority of 2015 and 2016, but without clear
knowledge of the methodologies used for collecting data
on attacks, it is impossible to assess the monitoring
mechanisms utilized.
It was not possible for the authors to clearly distin-
guish intentionality of attacks due to varying methodolo-
gies. Some sources of data used intentionality as
inclusion criteria, like for the conflicts in Chechnya and
Kosovo. But for others, intentionality is not included in
the definition of an attack on health care, making it diffi-
cult to assess this factor’s relationship with the apparent
increase in attacks. For many conflicts it is not clear if
destruction of facilities is a byproduct of the failure to
take precautions required by Geneva Conventions or if
attacks were a deliberate strategy. Moreover, reports do
not allow perfect insight into the total number of
attacks. For example, the United States and allies likely
dropped half a million tons of bombs in Iraq by 2005,
potentially masking the extent to which those forces
avoided health facilities [31]. The reports of attacks on
health care in Yemen are characterized by this uncer-
tainty of intentionality [6, 7].
In Kosovo, the intentionality of destroying health facil-
ities is well understood. Serbs were targeting Kosovar
Albanians and systematically destroyed towns where this
population lived, burning clinics as well as house and
schools. They did not destroy hospitals [3].
In Syria, the intentionality of many attacks is clear
through evidence presented by Physicians for Human
Rights. They report that 24% of the facilities attacked
have been attacked more than once, 60% of all attacks
were carried out with discriminate weapons (mortars,
missiles, rockets, etc.), and 31% of facilities attacked
were located in isolated or sparsely populated areas away
from other buildings [1]. During the siege of Aleppo in
July of 2016, the four remaining facilities were bombed
on the same day [32]. Events like this are only plausibly
explained by intentionality.
There are many limitations to be considered with this
analysis. The conflict in Bosnia, and to a lesser degree in
Kosovo and Chechnya, happened during a period when
the internet was less effectively capturing public events.
On the other hand, population-based surveys like those
conducted in Chechnya and Kosovo are not seen in
other conflicts. Therefore, the data found for facilities
attacked may or may not be fully complete. The esti-
mates for Syria and Yemen also are not completely up to
date, as we decided to use data from Physicians for
Human Rights and Unicef reported in spring 2017 and
2016, respectively. Furthermore, the varied definitions of
an attack and methodologies indicate that the same type
of event has a different probability of being captured in
different countries, making the comparison of data
across conflicts challenging. Our analysis and conclusion
are based off these rough estimates.
We recognize that the number of facilities attacked
does not address attacks on health personnel. In a study
conducted of occupied Iraq by Burnham et al. in 2012,
the violent death rate of physicians in Baghdad peaked
at 47.6/1000/year and remained constant outside of
Baghdad at 25.3/1000/year during the conflict, at least
twice that of the general population [33]. It is not con-
clusive whether the increased rate of murders of medical
professionals during this time is a deliberate attack on
health care or due to other considerations such as status
and class of physicians in Iraq. Another estimate made
in 2007 by the Iraq Medical Association reported that
2000 doctors had been killed since the start of the 2003
invasion [34]. In Kosovo before the conflict, Albanian
doctors were systematically persecuted by Serbs, and
were subject to mass firings and elimination of medical
training opportunities [3]. In the survey of the conflict,
“PHR has documented the targeting and murder of at
least three physicians in the fall of 1998 and targeted
murders of at least nine others in the past several
months” during the short conflict [3]. These examples
highlight that the facility attack reports we analyzed are
not sufficient to determine the overall level of violence
inflicted on health care in these conflicts.
Finally, social medial and reporting mechanisms may
naturally be improving with time, making surveillance of
such events better. We choose the conflicts in Bosnia,
Chechnya, and Kosovo because they had been
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intensively studied, which we hoped would help to cor-
rect for this early Internet age. But, this conscious selec-
tion excludes conflicts like those in the Central African
Republic and South Sudan where attacks on medical fa-
cilities may be widespread, but monitoring is believed to
be relatively incomplete.
Conclusion and recommendation
While our study revealed that attacks on health care in
conflicts are not a new phenomenon, and it is not easy
to compare conflicts from 20 years ago with today, there
appears to be a comparatively high number of attacks on
hospitals in Syria. The figures in Yemen are also troub-
ling, but the lack of defined methodologies prevents us
from reaching a firm conclusion. It also cannot be deter-
mined if intentional attacks on health care have in-
creased given the varying definitions of what constitutes
an attack in the methodologies. We believe that Physi-
cians for Human Rights and the Monitoring Violence
against Health Care network have demonstrated that it
is possible to implement a surveillance system to capture
attacks on health care in a time of war. They have docu-
mented evidence of intentional and repeated patterns of
attacks. This is invaluable because those who carry out
the abuses cannot deny these acts at a later time. A
global, standardized surveillance system that utilizes
primary and secondary sources must be implemented in
Yemen, and in other fragile contexts.
The World Health Assembly’s 2012 Resolution re-
quires the World Health Organization to establish this
global system for the collection and dissemination of
data so that the conversation and evidence is expanded
to include all other conflicts [35]. It is disappointing that
the implementation of this system has been delayed sev-
eral times, given its importance. However, after lessons
that were learned from earlier iterations in Afghanistan
and Syria, we note that the methodology for this surveil-
lance system has now been finalized and is being rolled
out. It will utilize a combination of primary and second-
ary sources for capturing and verifying events.
Regardless of whether Syria is an extremely egregious vio-
lation of International Humanitarian Law compared to past
conflicts, or attacks of health facilities have been better
documented in Syria than in past conflicts, it is discou-
raging that there has been impunity for these hundreds of
incidents. The less clear image of health care attacks docu-
mented by WHO and UNICEF in Yemen suggest little
hope in this setting for legal or political recourse for such
violations. This hopelessness, and the difficulties in this re-
view in establishing a typical level of collateral health care
damage, highlights the logic and importance of the 2012
World Health Assembly demand that WHO establish a
systematic monitoring process for health care attacks.
This article is dedicated to Dr. Mohammad Wassim Maaz:
The Syrian pediatrician, Dr. Mohammad Wassim Maaz
died in an airstrike on the al-Quds hospital in Aleppo,
Syria in April 2016 which killed him, a dentist, three
nurses and 22 civilians (Fig. 1). The Al-Quds hospital
was supported by Médecins Sans Frontières and the
International Committee of the Red Cross. A group of
doctors still practicing in Aleppo commemorated him by
saying, “We will always remember Dr. Maaz as the
kindest and bravest of souls, whose devotion to treating
the youngest victims of this war was unparalleled,” We
dedicate our research to the memory of Dr. Mohammad
Wassim Maaz and to the other physicians, nurses,
and allied health professionals around the world who
have died practicing in the face of humanitarian crises
and war.
Fig. 1 The Syrian pediatrician, Dr. Mohammad Wassim Maaz.
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/29/mohammad-wassim-maaz-syrian-paediatrician-al-quds-airstrike
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